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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

TOM N. SOTF--.:R and
HELEN P. SOTER, his wife,
Plaintiffs-A ppcllants,
-vsWASATCH DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant
and
PAUL C. BOYCE and
HAZEL BOYCE, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents

Case No.

11119

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an attempt by admittedly defaulting appellants; who were represented, at all times, by competent
counsel; who, after receiving every conceivable consideration and after reeciving the benefit thereof; by doublecrossing and going back on not only their written agreement, but also on their legal counsel, do now endeavor
by use of the courts to effect an unjust, meritless and
harrassing cause of action against respondents. Also,
plaintiff, Tom N. Soter, is and was, at all times, by
profession a licensed and experienced real estate salesman.
Whenever the appellants are hereafter ref erred to,
they will be ref erred to as plaintiffs.
Whenever the respondents are hereinafter referred
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to, they will be referred to as defendants Boyce.
"\\Thenever the defendant, Wasatch Developml'nt
(Jorporation, a Utah corporation, is hereafter referred
to, it will be referred to as defendants Wasatch Development Corporation.
Plaintiffs were, at all times, represented by legal
counsel, Richard L. Bird, Jr.
Defendants Boyce were, at all times, represented
by legal counsel, George H. Searle.
Defendant vVasatch Development Corporation was,
at all times, represented by Mr. Jim P. Hansen, President of Wasatch Development Corporation.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Upon motion of defendants Boyce and after making
findings of fact, the Trial Court concluded that plailltiff's Complaint as to defendants Boyce should be dismissed with prejudice allowing plaintiffs cause of actioll
against defendant Wasatch Development Corporatioll to
remarn.
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STATEMENT OE' F ACT8
'I1he plaintiffs ,by Uniform Real Estate Contract, on
September 2, 1963, contracted to purchase from Convest
Corporation, the Castel Apartments and Convest Corporation subsequently conveyed its interest in said property to defendants Boyce.
Plaintiffs became delinq_uent on the payments due
under the terms of the contract and defendants Boyce
did have served upon plaintiffs on the 22nd day of September, 1965, a "Five Day Demand That Default Be
Remedied" by payment of $12,410.89 arrearage. (See
li:xhibit "X" R. 80-81-82. Defendants Boye were entitled
to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract against the plaintiffs, but instead, did
comply with the policy of Utah law which is to
"encourage equitable out-of-court settlements; and
to recognize a claim for conspiracy where the foref eiture provision of a contract is not enforced
would be a deviation from this policy," (See Bunnell v. Bills page 83 of 13 Utah 2nd).
Said Default to the date of the filing of this brief has
not been remedied and in addition thereto, neither have
the plaintiffs or defendant Vv asatch Development Corporation paid or tendered payment of any sum of money
whatsoever since• the 22nd day of September, 1965 to
the date hereof, a iwriod in excess of two and one-half
years duration.
Plaintiffs proposed at the time, by and through
their counsel, Richard L. Bird, Jr., that defendants Boyce
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ac.;cc~pt in lieu of defendants Boyce going forward with
their forfeiture right ol their right to foreclose a:::; in
ca:ses of mortgages (which includes a six month redemption period) an out-of-court settlement which consi:sted
of a written agreement to be entered into beween the
parties so as to keep legal expenses to a minimum and
at the same time be for the best interests of all parties
concerned.

Plaintiffs thereafter prepared a written agreement
and dated the :same the 17th day of September, 19G5.
Said written proposal was prepared on plaintiffs' counsel's stationery and was entitled "Agreement of Modification of Contract" (See Exhibit "B" R. 83-85-86).
Defendants Boyce refused to accept (in return for
their promise not pursue their remedies under the terms
of said Uniform Real Estate Contract) the written proposal of the plaintiffs set forth in Exhibit "B" (Sel'
R. 83-85-86) but did thereafter agree to not forfeit the
plaintiffs or foreclose the plaintiffs out of any possible
equity they might have had in the property under the
written terms set forth in Exhibit "C" (See R. 87-88).
'l1his written proposal, Exhibit "C", bearing the saml'
date of September 17, 1965, was the same proposal submitted earlier by the plaintiffs in Exhibit "B" (See R.
83-85-86) except as modified or as parts thereof were
rejected as indicated by the additions in writing and
the crossed-out portions indicated on the original writteu
proposal made by plaintiffs and set forth in Exhibit
"B" (See R. 83-85-86).
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In reliance upon plaintiffs signing and agreeing to
the terms set forth in agreement Exhibit "C" (tiee R. 8788), defendants Boyce refrained from immediately forfeiting the plaintiffs out of said property or foreclosing
the plaintiffs out of said property, saving thereby th(~
legal expenses that would be necessarily involved and
allowing the plaintiffs approximately six ( 6) months to
remedy their default.
The following provisions were set forth and agreed
to on Page 2 of Exhibit "C" (See R. 88):
"During a period six months from the date
hereof Buyers shall have the right to sell their
interest, refinance or otherwise bring the payments under the contract current, and all things
required to Buyers to any of such ends shall be
performed by Sellers or permitted by Sellers if it
appears that the cooperation of Sellers will enable
Buyers to succeed in selling, refinancing or otherwise bringing the payments current without damage to the sellers."
"If during the period of six months from the
date hereof the monthly payments are not kept
current and paid fully and Buyers shall be unable
to sell, refinance, or otherwise bring current all
past due and payments due under the said contract, then Buyers .shall be conclusively presumed
to have been in default for a period of six months
and to have had reasonable opportunity to remedy
the said default and sellers shall continue in possession without any obligation to recognize any
rights of Buyers to redeem or reinstate the contract and no further legal action shall be necessary to eliminate any and all claims of Buyers
in and to the said property."
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"Buyers have executed a quit claim deed to
the property to Richard L. Bird, Jr., Attorney at
Law, with copy attached hereto, which deed :-;hall
be delivered to Sellers on March 15, 1966 if Buyers
shall have failed to remedy their default as herein
provided."
"In other respects the said contract of September 2, 1963 shall remain in full force and

effect."

On the 12th day of March, 1966, the plaintiffs sold
and conveyed all their right, title and interest in and
to the property to defendant Wasach Development Corporation and this deed was duly recorded three (3) days
later on March 15, 1966 by the grantee thereof, Wasatch
Development Corporation (See Exhibit "D" R. 89).
(Prior to this time without knowledge or consent
of defendants Boyce, the plaintiffs falsely represented
that they owned the property and mortgaged the property to one, Chris Apostle for the sum of $19,549.23,
which mortgage to the date hereof has not yet been
released or satisfied.) (See Exhibit "E" R. 90).
After the plaintiffs had divested themselves of any
further interest, they may have had in the property an<l
also wrongfully mortgaged the property to one, Chris
Apostle ,for $19,549.23 thereby wrongfully and unlawfully slandering and clouding the title to the property
the defendants Boyce were approached by Mr. Jim Hansen, the President of Wasatch Development Corporation,
who represented to the defendants Boyce that plaintiff;;
had sold out and deeded the property to Wasatch DL'-
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velopment Corporation who he reprseented. Hansen tried
to negotiate with defendants Boyce for an equity in a
home for the arrearage plaintiffs owed under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the defendants Boyce.
(See Exhibit "H" R. 93-94 written by plaintiffs'
counsel verifying Hansen's attempt and plaintiffs
approval thereof to deal directly with defendants
Boyce concerning the arrearage and Hansen's
attempt to satisfy defendants Boyce as their contract requires.)
The 15th day of .March, 1966, passed without compliance by either the plaintiffs or defendant Wasatch
Development Corporation meeting the requirements and
defendants Boyce did, on the 21st day of March, 1966,
make written demand upon plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
counsel for delivery of the Quit Claim Deed executed by
the plaintiffs. (See Exhibit "G" R. 92).
The same day defendants Boyce's counsel, George
H. Searle, telephoned plaintiffs' counsel, Richard L. Bird,
Jr. and in no uncertain terms, notified plaintiffs' counsel
that defendants Boyce "wanted only money" and not
anything Hansen representing Wasatch Development
Corporation had to offer in lieu thereof (See Exhibit
"H" R. 93).
The next day, the 22nd day of March, 1966, plaintiffs' connsel prepared and mailed on behalf of the plaintiffs, a letter to the defendants Boyce's counsel, George
H. Searle, whereby he confirms giving notice to the
plaintiffs that defendants Boyce
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"want money only and not a chance to negotiate
with Hansen for Hansen's equity in a home."
"That plaintiffs had 15 days additional to come
itp with another buyer who could produce the
cash."
Counsel for plaintiffs further verified
"that since 1.lfr. Soter has in effect, sold to Mr.
Hans en, Soter has nothing more to say abo1.d it."
Also,
"Hansen recorded the Qitit Claim Deed and has
proceeded negotiations on a bilateral basis with
Boyce. This is alright with us provided it has the
approval of yoit and the Boyces." (See Exhibit
"H" R. 93-94)
At this time, the 22nd day of March, 1966, plaintiffs
had acquired from defendant Wasatch Development Corporation a completed "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase" (See R. 9 and R. 18) and had also divested
themselves of any and all interest in the Uniform Real
J:lJstate Contract by which they were purchasing from
Defendants Boyce (See Assignment of Contract R. 6fi).
Plaintiffs further had divested themselves of any and
all interest in the realty by "Quit Claim Deed" to defendant Wasatch Development Corporation which was
delivered and promptly recorded upon acceptance b>'
defendant Wasatch Development Corporation (See R. 64)
"An Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" may constitute a bindi.ng contract has often
been n~cognized by this Court" (See BunlPll '·
Bills Page 85 of 13 Ut. 2nd quoting Reich v.
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Christopulos, 123 Ut. 137, 256 P 2nd 238; Reese
v. Harper 8 Ut. 2nd 119, 329 P 2nd 410; Andreason v. Hansen, 8 U t. 2nd 370, 335 P 2nd 404.)
On the 25th day of March, 1966, the plaintiffs by
and through their counsel, Richard L. Bird, acknowledged

"the default of Thomas N. Soter in the payments
due Paul C. Boyce on the property at 171 East
4500 South."
Likewise, abo acknowledged by the plaintiffs, was that
the plaintiffs

"are of the opinion that except for the protracted
negotiations between Mr. Hansen and the Boyces
and the encouragement which these negotiations
gave Mr. Hansen to believe they were in substantial agreement there should be an extension of
time in which to meet the reqitirement of payment
under the contract."
Acknowledged also was

"that Mr. Soter will have until April 15, 1966,
to present the payments due in full and this should
be made to you without further negotiations with
Mr. Boyce."
Also understood and agreed to was

"Mr. Soter is in agreement that unless the money
is raised and tendered to you on or before April
15, 1966, I am aidhorized to deliver to you a QuitClaim Deed from Mr. and Mrs. Soter which I hold
in my files." (See Exhibit "I" R. 95)
The foregoing wm; set forth in writing and "Notice"
thereof was given by plaintiffs' counsel to plaintiffs
and also to defendant vVasatch Development Corpora-
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tion. (See Exhibit "I" R. 95).
Payment of said money referred to was not made
or tendered to the defendants Boyce on or before the
15th day of April, 1966, and on the 12th day of May,
1966, demand was made by defendants, Boyce, upon
plaintiffs' counsel Richard L. Bird, Jr., and the Deed
was finally mailed to the defendants Boyce on the 21st
day of May, 1966, a period of more than two months
past the time when it was due on the 15th day of March,
1966 to the defendants Boyce. (See Exhibit "K" R. 97)
DEFENDANTS BOYCE'S POSITION
The Trial Courts decision should be sustained and
plaintiffs denied an-{estopped from trying to use the
courts to make a mockery of contractual obligations and
honor.
ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs admit on Page 3 of their Brief that they
were delinquent on the payments due under the terms
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated the 2nd of
September, 1963. (See also R. 27 and 35). Plaintiff8
also admit the written agreement dated the 17th of September, 1965 wherein plaintiffs were given approximately
six months to bring the payments current, sell or refinance, "or otherwise bringing the payments current
without damage to the sellers," and if plaintiffs faikd
so to do, a Quit-Claim Deed to the subject property was
to be delivered to defendants Boyce by plaintiffs' attorney. (See Exhibit "C" R. 88)
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On Page four ( 4) of plaintiffs" brief, plaintiffs
allege they fonnd a buyer, \Vasatch Developrnt•nt Corporation, and pursuant thereto the plaintiffs did give
a Quit Claim Deed to defendant \Vasatch Development
Corporation. It is submitted the only duty owed by
defendants Boyce to plaintiffs under such circumstances
was to accept said buyer in the stead of plaintiffs bnt
subject to the right to receive payment and full performance on the part of Wasatch Development Corporation of any and all the obligations owed by the plaintiffs to defendants Boyce under the terms of the Uniform
Heal Estate Contract dated the 2nd of September, 1963
hereto before referred to. Defendants Boyce had a legal
right to payment, had a present, existing economic interest to protect ownership and the condition of the
property, to insist upon "Mr. Boyce wants money and
not a chance to negotiate with Hansen for Hansl'n \;
equity in a home" (See Exhibit "H" R. 93). Defendants
Boyce could not have possibly done anything detrimental
to plaintiffs' negotiations with defendant Wasatch Development Corporation prior to 15 March, 1968 or the
'·Ernest Money Agreement" would not have been executed, (R. 9 and R. 18) the "Assignment" executed (R.
65) and "Deed" given ( R. 64). After the 15th day of
March, 1966, if payment of arrearage had not been made
to defendants Boyce, they were entitled to
"continnP in possession without any obligation to
recognize any rights of plaintiffs to redeem or
reinstate the contract and no further lPgal action
shall be necessary to eleminate any and all claims
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of plaintiff in and to the said property" {Sec
Exhibit "C" R. 88) (See Bunnell v. Bills at Page
90 of 13 Ut. 2nd).
Without confusing matters but to point out the false
colors and the way plaintiffs operate it is noteworthy
to notice the affirmative defenses that remain unanswered, set out in defendant Wasatch Development Corporation Answer to plaintiff's Complaint (R. 25-26)
(6) & (7) False representations as to apartment
mcome
(8) Non disclosure of Escrow Agreement (See
Exhibit "C" R. 87-88) (Which is also noteworthy to the effect that if defendant W asatch Development Corporation was without
knowledge of same it would be impossible for
defendants Boyce to inter£ ere between plaintiffs and defendant Wasatch Development
Corporation, let alone accept and record Deed
(See Exhibit "D" R. 89) accepting and obligating themselves under Ernest money agreement. (See R. 9 and 18)
(9) Undisclosed and unlawful mortgage lien and
encumbrance to Chris Apostal (See Exhibit
"E" R. 90) which made it impossible for <l<'f endant Wasatch Development Corporation to
borrow money on property purchased; also
see plaintiffs' false Warranty of no other
encumbrance (R. 65) dated 12 March 1966.
Of more importance are sworn answen; to defendants
Boyce Interrogatory 1 (R. 32) requesting how, when,
where and what interference caused the transaction between plaintiffs and defendant Wasatch Development
Corporation to be not completed keeping in mind their
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Ernest Money Agreement is dated 8 l<'ebruary, 1966
(R. 9 and 18). The Assignment of Contract is dated 12
March, 196() (R. G5) and Deed is notarized the 12th day
of March, 1966 and recorded the 15th day of March,
1966 (R. 64).
I February 5, 1966, conven;ation in which plaintiffs allege defendant, Paul Boyce, was considering trading his equity in the apartment for a home. (It is hard
for the undersigned to understand how the plaintiffs'
can complain if the defendants Boyce chose to sell their
equity for any price whatsoever, even for $10.00 as
would be their right and how this could interfere with
plaintiffs' negotiations with defendant Wasatch Development Corporation when 3 days later the Plaintiffs and
Defendants ·wasatch Development Corporation executed
the Earnest Money Agreement.
II February 20, 1966, Request by plaintiffs to defendant, Paul Boyce, for a breakdown of income which
although not in the record, was supplied and given to
plaintiffs. This request was satisfied by defendants
Boyce in compliance with paragraph 4 of hereto before
modification agreement (See Exhibit "C" R. 88) and
which required of defendants Boyce cooperation so that
plaintiffs could "succeed in selling, refinancing or other\\~isc• bringing the payments cnrrent without damage to
ch•f Pndants Boye<'. (Plaintiffs succeeded in selling and
gave Assignment and Deed to defendant Wasatch DeV<'lopment Corporation on 12 March, 1966) (See R. 64
and R. 65)
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III March 1, 1966, conversation with defendant,
Paul Boyce, to the effect that he and defendant Wasatch
Dewloprnent Corporation were working out a deal
(Plaintiffs had a binding Ernest Money Agreement already executed with defendant Wasatch Development
Corporation and the Deed and Assignment was given
by Plaintiffs in compliance therewith 12 days later (See
H. G4 and R. 65) to Defendant Wasatch Development
Corporation.)
IY March 14, 19G6 (two days after plaintiffs had
given ,on 12 March, 1966, a Warranty Assignment of
Contract (R. 65) and Deed to property (R. 64) to defendant Wasatch Development Corporation which was
accepted by and recorded by defendant Wasatch Development Corporation (See "Grantee" top of Exhibit "D"
R. 89). Meeting with plaintiffs and all defendants in
which defendants orally agreed to accept less than the
$13,000.00 cash arrearage. It is submitted that acceptance
of any lesser sum than $13,000.00 owed could hardly hnrt
or be detrimental to plaintiffs and would in no way,
effect plaintiffs' right to enforce their rights against drfendant Wasatch Development Corporation and the
property which plaintiffs had divested themselves thereof
two days earlier. It is common sense if the three previous alleged conversations I, II and III had been detrimental to plaintiffs the defendant Wasatch Developmrnt
Corporation certainly would not have accepted and recorded the Deed (R. 89) and the Warranty of Contract
assignment (R. 65) and after doing so, be attempting to
get defendants Boyce to accept less than he $13,000.00
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arrearage owed if they did not believe tlll'y had to be
obligated to pay the same at that time. Any, all and full
complete rights of the plaintiffs were protected by plaintiffs further recording of "Claim of Vendors Lien" pn·pared by plaintiffs' counsel and recorded the 17th of
March 1966. Further it would at this tim<:~ be none of
plaintiffs' business or concern if defendants Boyce did
agree to accept less than the $13,000.00 cash arrearage
owing to them. Plaintiffs had already executed a binding "Sales Contract" with defendant Wasatch Development Corporation; had already assigned all their interm;t
in their Uniform Real Estate Contract whereby they were
purchasing from defendants Boyce and had already divested themselves of any interest in the real property
by Quit Claim Deed to defendant Wasatch Development
Corporation.
"Where persons have merely pursued their
own ends without any desire or intention of causing another to breach his contract, they should
not be held liable for the others' breach. To hold
them liable for damages so far removed from their
action, would amount to an undue restraint upon
their freedom to act." (See Bunnell v. Bills at
Page 91 of 13 Ut. 2nd).
All plaintiffs or their assignee defendant Wasatch
Development Corporation had to do was to come up and
pay the arrearage owed before the 15th of March, 1966.
Neither plaintiffs or their assignee defendant Wasatch
Development Corporation could do this, defendants Boyce
were entitled to nothing more nor were they obligated
to take or accept anything less.
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Lastly -

If the contention of the plaintiffs which

amounts only to the defendants Boyce refusing to sell
or give their equity for less than the cash owed to them,
by accepting the "cashless" defendant Wasatch Development Corporation in their stead, has any merit whatsoever, the same is most certainly, adequately and legally
cured by the consideration given by defendants Boyce
in extending to 15 April, 1966 time for plaintiffs to
make payment and plaintiffs' agreement
"that unh~ss the money was raised and tendered
before the 15.th of April, 1966 the Deed left with
plaintiffs' counsel was to be delivered to defendants Boyce." (See E~ibit "H" R. 93-94 and Exhibit "I" R. 95)
Defendants finally received the Deed promised from
plaintiffs' counsel on 22 May, 1966, eight months after
these defendants first made demand upon plaintiffs to
pay $12,410.89 arrearage owed.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs' appeal

should be dismissed and denied and the lower court:s
decision sustained leaving to plaintiffs whatever cause
of action available, if any they have, against defendant
Wasatch Development Corporation.
Respectfully,
SEARLE & ASHWORTH

tf1

/

ByQ~,L~~
2805 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants,
Paul C. Boyce and Hazel
Boyce, Defendants and
Respondents.
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